Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a logic based on team semantics, called FOT, whose expressive power coincides with first-order logic both on the level of sentences and (open) formulas, and we also show that a sublogic of FOT, called FOT ↓ , captures exactly downward closed first-order team properties. We axiomatize completely the logic FOT, and also extend the known partial axiomatization of dependence logic to dependence logic enriched with the logical constants in FOT ↓ .
Introduction
In this paper, we define logics based on team semantics for characterizing first-order team properties, and we also study the axiomatization problem of these logics.
Team semantics is a semantical framework originally introduced by Hodges [21] , and later systematically developed by Väänänen with the introduction of dependence logic [31] , which extends first-order logic with dependence atoms. Other notable logics based on team semantics include independence logic introduced by Grädel and Väänänen [16] (which is first-order logic extended with independence atoms), and inclusion logic introduced by Galliani [11] (which is first-order logic extended with inclusion atoms). In team semantics formulas are evaluated in a model over sets of assignments for the free variables (called teams) rather than single assignments as in the usual first-order logic. Teams X with the domain {v 1 , . . . , v k } are essentially k-ary relations rel(X) = {(s(v 1 ), . . . , s(v k )) | s ∈ X}, and thus open formulas define team properties. In general, knowing the expressive power of a logic for sentences (with no free variables) does not automatically give a characterization for the expressive power of open formulas of the same logic. Such a peculiar phenomenon has sparked several studies on the expressive power of logics based on team semantics. In particular, while it follows straightforwardly from the earlier known results of Henkin, Enderton, Walkoe, and Hodges [20, 8, 32, 22] The latter characterize all ESO team properties [11] , whereas the former characterize only downward closed ESO team properties [26] . Along the same line, a later breakthrough showed that inclusion logic corresponds, over sentences, to positive greatest fixed-point logic [15] , which is strictly more expressive than first-order logic as well. In this paper we define a team-based logic, called FOT, whose expressive power coincides with first-order logic (FO) both on the level of sentences and open formulas, in the sense that FOT-formulas characterize (modulo the empty team) exactly team properties definable by first-order sentences with an extra relation symbol R. To the best of the authors' knowledge, no such logic has been defined previously.
In related previous work, it was shown in [10, 13, 28] that first-order logic extended with constancy atoms =(x) and FO extended with classical negation ∼ are both equivalent to FO over sentences, whereas on the level of formulas they are both strictly less expressive than FO, and thus fail to capture all first-order team properties. It was also illustrated in [24] that a certain simple disjunction of dependence atoms already defines an NP-complete team property. Therefore, any logic based on team semantics having the disjunction ∨ inherited from first-order logic and in which dependence atoms are expressible will be able to express NP-complete team properties indicating that ∨ is too expressive connective to be added to FOT. The logic FOT we define in this paper has weaker version of disjunction \\/ and classical negation∼ as well as weaker quantifiers ∀ 1 , ∃ 1 . We prove, in Section 3, that our logic FOT captures first-order team properties (modulo the empty team) and we also show, as an application of Lyndon's Interpolation Theorem of first-order logic, that a sublogic of FOT, denoted as FOT ↓ , captures exactly downward closed first-order team properties (modulo the empty team).
In the second part of this paper study the axiomatization problem of our logics FOT and FOT ↓ . In Section 4 we introduce a sound and complete system of natural deduction for FOT that on one hand behaves like the system of FO to a certain extend (in the sense of Lemma 12) , while on the other hand incorporates natural and interesting rules for inclusion atoms and their interaction with the weak logical constants.
In Section 5, we apply our results to the problem of finding axiomatizations for larger and larger fragments of dependence logic and its variants by extending the known partial axiomatization of dependence logic to D enriched with the logical constants in FOT ↓ (denoted as D ⊕ FOT ↓ ), which, by our result in the first part of this paper, is expressively equivalent to D. While D is not effectively axiomatizable (for it is equivalent to ESO), a complete axiomatization for first-order consequences of D-sentences has been given in [27] . More precisely, a system of natural deduction for dependence logic was introduced in [27] for which the completeness theorem
holds whenever Γ is a set of D-sentences and θ is an FO-sentence. This result has been, subsequently, generalized to e.g., allows also open formulas [25] , and treats also independence logic [17] or dependence logic with generalized quantifiers [9] . A recent new generalization given in [33] extends the known systems for D and Ind to cover the case when θ in (1) is not necessarily an FO-formula but merely a formula defining a first-order team property. However, since the problem of whether a D-or Ind-formula defines a first-order team property is undecidable, the extension of [33] is not effectively represented. Motivated by the results of [33] , we give an effective extension of (1), in which θ is a sentence of our compositionally defined logic FOT ↓ and Γ is a set of D ⊕ FOT ↓ -sentences. Finding an effective axiomatization in the more general case of Ind enriched with the logical constants in FOT is left as future work.
Apart from theoretical significance, our results also provide new logical tools for the applications of team-based logics in other related areas; such applications have been studied in recent years, e.g., in database theory [19] , formal semantics of natural language [4, 5] , Bayesian statistics [18, 7] , social choice theory [30] , and quantum information theory [23] . In particular, inquisitive logic [6] adopts, independently, also the team semantics to provide formal semantics of questions in natural language, and the first-order version of inquisitive logic can be viewed as a team-based logic (in a slightly different setting) with the weak disjunction \\/ and the weak quantifiers ∀ 1 , ∃ 1 . The study we provide in this paper for the expressive power and axiomatization problem of these weaker logical constants will potentially help clarifying properties of first-order inquisitive logic. In the recent formalization of Arrow's Theorem [2] in social choice in independence logic [30] , the weak disjunction \\/ plays a natural role, and the completeness theorem of the type (1) was crucial for deriving Arrow's Theorem formally. The axiomatization results we obtained in this paper are then expected to contribute to the formal analysis of Arrow's Theorem and other impossibility theorems in social choice.
Preliminaries
We consider first-order vocabularies L with an equality symbol =. An L-term t is defined inductively as usual, and formulas of First-order Logic (FO) are defined as:
Throughout the paper, we reserve the first Greek letters α, β, γ, δ for first-order formulas. As usual, define α → β := ¬α ∨ β. We use the letters v, x, y, z, . . . in sans-serif face to stand for sequences of variables, and sequences of terms are denoted as t, t ′ , . . . We write Fv(α) for the set of free variables of α, and write α(x) to indicate that the free variables of α are among x = x 1 , . . . , x n . A formula with no free variables is called a sentence.
For any L-model M , we use the same notation M also to denote its domain. We write L(R) for the vocabulary expanded from L by adding a fresh relation symbol R, and write (M, R M ) for the L(R)-expansion of M in which the k-ary relation symbol R is interpreted as R M ⊆ M k . We sometimes write α(R) to emphasize that the first-order formula α is in the vocabulary L(R) for some L.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the usual Tarskian semantics of first-order logic. In this paper, we consider logics with team semantics. A team X of M over a set V of variables is a set of assignments s : V → M , where V is called the domain of X, denoted dom(X). Given a first-order formula α, given any L-model M and any team X over V ⊇ Fv(α), we define the satisfaction relation M |= X α inductively as follows:
-M |= X λ for λ a first-order atom iff for all s ∈ X, M |= s λ in the usual sense.
It is easy to verify that first-order formulas have the following properties:
Downward closure property together with union closure property are equivalent to Flatness property: M |= X φ ⇐⇒ M |= {s} φ for all s ∈ X.
Logics based on team semantics do not in general have the flatness property. For instance, dependence logic [31] , which is first-order logic extended with dependence atoms =(t 1 , . . . , t n , t), is downward closed but not flat; and inclusion logic [11] , which is first-order logic extended with inclusion atoms t 1 , . . . , t n ⊆ t ′ 1 , . . . , t ′ n , is union closed but not flat. Especially, dependence atoms and inclusion atoms are not flat. We recall their semantics below:
In this paper, we study two (non-flat) logics based on team semantics, called FOT and FOT ↓ , whose formulas are built from a different (yet similar) set of connectives and quantifiers than those in first-order logic as follows:
where λ is an arbitrary first-order atomic formula, x and y are two sequences of variables of the same length, and δ is a quantifier-free and disjunction-free formula (i.e., δ ::= λ | ¬δ | δ ∧ δ). We call the logical constants∼, \\/ , ∃ 1 , ∀ 1 , which were introduced in [33, 1, 26] , weak classical negation, weak disjunction, weak existential quantifier and weak universal quantifier, respectively. Their team semantics are defined as:
It is easy to verify that formulas of FOT and FOT ↓ have the empty team property, and FOT ↓ formulas have the downward closure property. In FOT we adopt the usual convention for classical implication, and write φ ψ foṙ ∼ φ \\/ ψ and φ ψ for (φ ψ) ∧ (ψ φ). With the help of the classical implication , one can easily express ¬δ for δ being quantifier-free and disjunction free (or flat) as
Also, dependence atoms =(x, y) with variables as arguments are definable in FOT:
Recall that the constancy atom =(x) abbreviates the dependence atom =( , x) with the first argument being the empty sequence , and its semantics reduces to
Constancy atoms can be defined alternatively as =(x) ≡ ∃ 1 y(y = x).
Characterizing first-order team properties
In this section, we prove that FOT-formulas characterize first-order team properties (modulo the empty team), and FOT ↓ -formulas characterize downward closed first-order team properties (modulo the empty team).
Let us first define formally the relevant notions. Observe that a team X of an Lmodel M over a domain {v 1 , . . . , v k } can also be viewed as a k-ary relation rel(
of an L-model M a local team property; and a (global) team property is a class P of local team properties P M for all L-models M . A formula φ(v) of a logic based on team semantics clearly defines a team property
Clearly, the team properties
Note also that while the empty relation / 0 may not be contained in a team property P M , since all team-based logics considered in this paper have the empty team property (i.e., / 0 is in P φ M for all φ), we will confine ourselves only to those team properties P with the empty relation / 0 contained in each local property P M . We call a team property P first-order if there is a first-order L(R)-sentence α(R) such that (M, A) |= α(R) iff A ∈ P M for all M and all nonempty relations A. It is worth noting that we are using the terminology "definability" in two different semantic settings: Even though every first-order team property P is (trivially) defined by some first-order L(R)-sentence α(R) with an extra relation symbol R (in the sense of the usual semantics of first-order logic), it does not follow that each such first-order team property P is definable by some first-order L-formula β(v) in the team semantics sense (i.e., P = P β M ). As a simple illustration, in view of the flatness property of first-order formulas, the following very simple team property (of the empty vocabulary L 0 )
cannot be defined by any first-order formula β(v) of the empty vocabulary L 0 .
We now show that the team properties defined by formulas of FOT and FOT ↓ are first-order.
Proof. We prove the theorem by proving a slightly more general claim: For any subfor-
such that for all L-models M , teams X and sequences a of elements in M ,
It is easy to verify that the formula γ θ defined inductively as follows (and found essentially in, e.g., [11, 33] ) will work:
for some quantifier-free and disjunction-free first-order formula
, where ρ(vx) and σ(vx) are two sequences of variables from vx, let γ θ (R,
and does not belong to the case of the first item, let
Next we prove the reverse direction of Theorem 1, from which we can conclude that FOT-formulas characterize exactly first-order team properties (modulo the empty team).
Moreover, if R occurs in γ(R) only negatively (i.e., every occurrence of R is in the scope of an odd number of nested negation symbols), φ γ can be also chosen to be an
Proof. We may assume w.l.o.g. that the first-order sentence γ(R) is in prenex normal form Q 1 x 1 . . . Q n x n θ(x), where Q i ∈ {∀, ∃}, θ is quantifier-free and in negation normal form (i.e., negations occur only in front of atomic formulas), and every occurrence of R is of the form Rx i for some sequence x i of bound variables (for Rt ≡ ∃y(y = t ∧ Ry)).
is defined inductively as follows:
Next, we show by induction that for each quantifier-free formula θ(x), for any nonempty team X over {v 1 , . . . , v k } and a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ M ,
If θ = λ(x) is an atomic formula in which R does not occur, then φ λ = λ(x) and
The cases when θ = θ 0 (x) ∨ θ 1 (x) and θ = θ 0 (x) ∧ θ 1 (x) follow easily from the induction hypothesis.
Finally, we have
This completes the proof for the translation into FOT. Now, if R occurs only negatively in γ (thus also in θ), we can define alternatively the translation into FOT ↓ as: If
It is easy to verify that (3) still holds for these two cases.
⊓ ⊔
To conclude from the above theorems that FOT ↓ -formulas characterize downward closed first-order team properties (modulo the empty team), we now prove a characterization theorem for first-order sentences α(R) that define downward closed team properties, by applying Lyndon's Interpolation Theorem of first-order logic, which we recall below.
Theorem 3 (Lyndon's Interpolation [29] ). Let α be a first-order L 0 -formula and β a first-order L 1 -formula. If α |= β, then there is a first-order L 0 ∩ L 1 -formula δ such that α |= δ and δ |= β, and moreover a predicate symbol has a positive (resp. negative) occurrence in δ only if it has a positive (resp. negative) occurrence in both α and β.
Proposition 4. A first-order L(R)-sentence α(R) defines a downward closed team property with respect to R if and only if there is a first-order L(R)-sentence β(R)
such that α ≡ β and R occurs only negatively in β.
Proof. "⇐=": Suppose α is a first-order L(R)-sentence in which the k-ary predicate R occurs only negatively, and we assume w.l.o.g. that α is in negation normal form. We can show by induction that α is downwards closed with respect to R. The only nontrivial case is when α = ¬Rt. In this case, for any model M , any A ⊆ B ⊆ M k , and any assignment s,
Suppose that α is a first-order L(R)-sentence that is downwards closed with respect to R. It is easy to see that α ≡ ∃S(α(S/R) ∧ ∀x(Rx → Sx)), where α(S/R) is Table 1 . Introduction and elimination rules for the weak logical constants 
Axiomatizing FOT
In this section, we introduce a system of natural deduction for FOT, and prove the soundness and completeness theorem. For the convenience of our proofs, we present our system of natural deduction in sequent style.
Definition 6. The system of natural deduction for FOT consists of all rules for identity, all rules in Table 1 , and the following rules, where letters in sans-serif face (such as x, y) stand for sequences of variables, c is a constant symbol, =(t) is short for ∃ 1 x(x = t), con(t) is short for i =(t i ), and cx ⊆ vy is short for ∃ 1 u(u = c ∧ ux ⊆ vy):
. α is∼ and inclusion atom-free. (c). c is a sequence of constant symbols that do not occur in Γ or φ, and λ is a first-order atom.
(d). Γ is a set of sentences in which R does not occur, φ(R) is an inclusion atom-free sentence in which the relation symbol R occurs only in the form Rx, and φ(v) is a formula with free variables v obtained from φ(R) by replacing every Rx by x ⊆ v.
We write Γ ⊢ FOT φ or simply Γ ⊢ φ, if the sequent Γ ⊢ φ is derivable in the system. Write φ ⊣⊢ ψ if φ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ φ.
The weak disjunction \\/ admits the usual introduction and elimination rule, and note that the usual elimination rule is not sound for the other disjunction ∨. The soundness of the introduction and elimination rule for ∃ 1 follows from the equivalence ∃ 1 x ≡ ∃x(=(x) ∧ φ), and the introduction and elimination rule for ∀ 1 have a similar flavor. The rules ⊆ Id, ⊆ Pro, ⊆ Tr and ⊆ Cmp for inclusion atoms were introduced in [17] , and the first three rules completely axiomatize the implication problem of inclusion dependencies in database theory [3] . The two weakening rules ⊆ W con and ⊆ W ∃ 1 for inclusion atoms extend the length of an inclusion atom. We leave it for the reader to verify that these rules for inclusion atoms are also sound and derivable if constants are allowed to occur as arguments in inclusion atoms (i.e., to allow inclusion atoms, e.g., of the form cx ⊆ vy). The rules∼ ⊆ E and∼λE in a sense describe the meanings of a negated inclusion atom∼ x ⊆ y and a negated first-order atom λ(x) by providing a witness c. These two rules are designed for deriving Proposition 9(ii)(v) (which is crucial for the normal form lemma, Lemma 11, leading to the completeness theorem), and they can also be formulated, in a more complex form, without any mention of the constant symbols. The rule ⊆wI R simulates the transformation in Theorem 2, and it will be applied in the proof of the completeness theorem (Theorem 13) in a reverse manner with respect to a fresh relation symbol R, which is assumed to be always available. How to simplify this rule ⊆ wI R is left as future work.
Theorem 7 (Soundness
Proof. We only verify the soundness of∼ ⊆ E and ⊆ wI R .
∼ ⊆ E: Suppose Γ |=∼ x ⊆ y and Γ, c ⊆ x,∼ c ⊆ y |= φ, and suppose that for some L-model M and team X, M |= X Γ . Then we have M |= X∼ x ⊆ y, which implies that there exists s ∈ X such that for the L(c)-model (M, s(x)), we have (M, s(x)) |= X c ⊆ x ∧∼ c ⊆ y. Thus, by the assumption, (M, s(x)) |= X φ, which gives M |= X φ since c do not occur in φ.
⊆ wI R : Suppose Γ, φ(v) |= ⊥. Clearly, every FOT-formula can be turned into a (semantically) equivalent formula in prenex and negation normal form (cf. Proposition 8(ii)(iii)(iv)). We may then w.l.o.g. assume that φ(v) is in prenex and negation normal form. Then there exist a model M and a nonempty team X such that M |= X Γ and M |= X φ(v). By (the proof of) Theorem 2, (M, rel(X)) |= φ * (R) in FO, where φ * (R) is an FO-sentence obtained from the inclusion atom-free FOT-sentence φ(R) by replacing every logical constant in FOT by its counterpart in FO, i.e., by replacing∼ by ¬, \\/ by ∨, ∀ 1 by ∀, and ∃ 1 by ∃. It is not hard to prove that (M, rel(X)) |= { / 0} φ(R) in FOT follows. Since Γ is a set of sentences in which R does not occur, we also have (M, rel(X)) |= { / 0} Γ . Also, since X = / 0, (M, rel(X)) |= ∃ 1 zRz. Hence, we conclude Γ, ∃ 1 zRz, φ(R) |= ⊥. ⊓ ⊔
We collect the basic facts concerning the logical constants in FOT in the following proposition. The proofs are standard and left to the reader.
A routine inductive proof that uses Proposition 8(i) shows that the usual Replacement Lemma holds for our logic, that is, if θ ⊣⊢ χ, then φ ⊣⊢ φ(χ/θ), where φ(χ/θ) is obtained from φ by replacing an occurrence of θ in φ by χ.
It is easy to prove that Γ, φ ⊢ ψ iff Γ ⊢ φ ψ. In the following proposition, we list some derivable technical clauses that will be used in the proof of the completeness theorem.
Proposition 9. Let ξ and η be two sequences of variables of the same length.
Proof. Item (i): The right to left direction follows from ⊆ Pro (applied to repeated arguments in the inclusion atom) and rules of identity. For the left to right direction, xyξ ⊆ vvη ⊢ xξ ⊆ vη follows from ⊆ Pro. Next, by ⊆ Pro, rules of identity and ⊆ Cmp we have xyξ
Item (ii): For the right to left direction, by Proposition 8(iii)(iv), it suffices to show the contrapositive∼ ξ ⊆ η ⊢ ∃ 1 x(x ⊆ ξ ∧∼ x ⊆ η). For any sequence c of fresh constant symbols, we have c ⊆ ξ,∼ c ⊆ η ⊢ ∃ 1 x(x ⊆ ξ ∧∼ x ⊆ η) by Proposition 8(i). Then the desired clause follows from∼ ⊆ E. For the other direction, by ∀ 1 I, it suffices to show that ξ ⊆ η ⊢ c ⊆ ξ c ⊆ η for c a sequence of fresh constant symbols, which is further reduced to showing that ξ ⊆ η, c ⊆ ξ ⊢ c ⊆ η. But this follows from ⊆ Tr.
Item (iii): We first show con(z) ⊢ wξ ⊆ zη (w = z ∧ ξ ⊆ η), which is equivalent to con(z), wξ ⊆ zη ⊢ w = z ∧ ξ ⊆ η. By ⊆ W con we have con(z), w ⊆ z ⊢ wz ⊆ zz. By item (i), wz ⊆ zz ⊢ w = z. Hence, by ⊆ Pro the desired clause follows. Next, we show con(z), w = z, ξ ⊆ η ⊢ wξ ⊆ zη. Again by ⊆ W con we have that ξ ⊆ η, con(z) ⊢ zξ ⊆ zη, and thus the desired clause follows from rules of identity.
Item (iv): The direction con(x), x ⊆ v ⊢ ∃ 1 y(xy ⊆ vu) is given by ⊆ W ∃ 1 , and the other direction con(x), ∃ 1 y(xy ⊆ vu) ⊢ x ⊆ v follows easily from ⊆ Pro.
Item (v): We first show the left to right direction, which, by ∀ 1 I, is reduced to showing that λ(z) ⊢ c ⊆ z λ(c) for c a sequence of fresh constant symbols. But this follows from ⊆ Cmp. Next, we show the other direction, which is equivalent to the contrapositive∼ λ(z) ⊢ ∃ 1 w(w ⊆ z ∧∼ λ(w)). For any sequence c of fresh constant symbols, we have c ⊆ z,∼ λ(c) ⊢ ∃ 1 w(w ⊆ z ∧∼ λ(w)) by Proposition 8(i). Then the desired clause follows from∼λE.
⊓ ⊔
To prove the completeness theorem, we also need the following three lemmas. The first lemma emphasizes the fact that all variables quantified by the weak quantifiers have constant values, the second lemma proves a normal form for FOT-formulas, and the third lemma shows that derivations in the system of FO can be simulated in the system of FOT. Proof. By applying Proposition 8(ii), Q 1 I and Q 1 E, it is easy to prove that Q 1 xθ(x, v) ⊣⊢ Q 1 x(θ(x, v) ∧ con(x)). Next we push the formula con(x) inside the quantifier-free formula θ in negation normal form all the way to the front of literals by using Replacement Lemma and the standard equivalences (θ 0 ∧ θ 1 ) ∧ con(x) ⊣⊢ (θ 0 ∧ con(x)) ∧ (θ 1 ∧ con(x)) and (θ 0 \\/ θ 1 ) ∧ con(x) ⊣⊢ (θ 0 ∧ con(x)) \\/ (θ 1 ∧ con(x)). Proof. We first turn φ(v) into an equivalent formula in prenex and negation normal form by exhaustively applying Proposition 8(ii)(iii)(iv). Assume that the bound variables of φ(v) are among x. By Lemma 10 we may also assume that every literal µ(x, v) in φ is replaced by µ(x, v) ∧ con(x) (call such a formula a formula in constant normal form).
Observe that now in φ(v) a generic first-order atom is of the form λ(x, v), and a generic inclusion atom is of the form ηξρσ ⊆ η ′ ξ ′ ρ ′ σ ′ (modulo permutation by ⊆ Pro), where |η| = |η ′ | ≥ 0, |ξ| = |ξ ′ | ≥ 0, |ρ| = |ρ ′ | ≥ 0 and |σ| = |σ ′ | ≥ 0,
for some bound variables x i from x, and free variables v i from v; -(ρ, ρ ′ ) = (v i , x i ) for some free variables v i from v, and bound variables x i from x;
To obtain the required normal form we have to transform every (first-order or inclusion) atom in φ in the required form. We achieve this in several steps.
In
Step 1 of our transformation, we replace in φ(v) every inclusion atom
Note that by Proposition 9(iii), we have
Hence, by Replacement Lemma, the resulting formula φ 1 (v) is provably equivalent to φ. We assume further (here and also in the other steps) that φ 1 (v) is turned into prenex, negation and constant normal form by applying Proposition 8(ii)(iii)(iv) and Lemma 10. In
Step 2, we replace in φ 1 (v) every first-order atom λ(x, v) by ∀ 1 yz(yz ⊆ xv λ(y, z)). By Proposition 9(v), the resulting formula φ 2 (v) is provably equivalent to φ 1 (v). Up to now, every first-order atom in the formula is transformed to the required form, and the steps afterwards will not generate first-order atoms in non-normal form.
Step 3, we apply Proposition 9(ii) to replace in φ 2 (v) every inclusion atom
, and denote the resulting formula by φ 3 (v). In Step 4, we apply Proposition 9(iii) to replace in φ 3 (v) every inclusion atom
and denote the resulting formula by φ 4 (v). Up to now every inclusion atom in the formula is transformed to the form x i ⊆ v i , where x i are bound variables and v i are free variables in φ 4 (v). Yet, v i may contain repetitions, and it may also be only a subsequence of v. Handling these requires two additional steps.
Step 5, we remove repetitions on the right side of the inclusion atoms, by applying Proposition 9(i) to replace in φ 4 (v) every inclusion atom of the form
Denote the resulting formula by φ 5 (v). In Step 6, we extend the length of those shorter inclusion atoms. Assuming v = v i v j , we apply Proposition 9(iv) to replace in φ 5 (v) every inclusion atom of the form x i ⊆ v i by ∃ 1 y(x i y ⊆ v i v j ). Denote the resulting formula by φ 6 (v).
As before we assume that φ 6 (v) is turned into prenex and negation normal form, but now we shall apply Lemma 10 in a reverse manner to remove the added constancy atoms for each literal in φ 6 . Finally, the resulting provably equivalent formula is in the required normal form. Note that our transformation clearly terminates, because we have performed the steps in the transformation in such an order that each step will not generate new formulas for which the transformations in the previous steps apply.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 12. Let ∆ ∪ {δ} be a set of FO-formulas whose free variables are among x.
, where * is the operation that replaces every logical constant in FO by its counterpart in FOT, and c is a sequence of fresh constant symbols. In particular, if ∆ ∪ {δ} is a set of FO-sentences, then ∆ ⊢ FO δ implies ∆ * ⊢ FOT δ * .
Proof. We prove that ∆ ⊢ FO δ implies ∆ * (c/x) ⊢ FOT δ * (c/x) by induction on the depth of the proof tree of ∆ ⊢ FO δ. If the proof tree has depth 1, then either δ ∈ ∆ or δ is the identity axiom t = t. In both cases ∆ * (c/x) ⊢ FOT δ * (c/x) trivially follows in our system.
If the proof tree has depth > 1, and the last step of the derivation of ∆ ⊢ FO δ is an application of a rule for ¬ or ∧ or ∨ in FO, then we derive ∆ * (c/x) ⊢ FOT δ * (c/x) by applying the induction hypothesis and the corresponding (classical) rules for∼ or ∧ or \\/ in our system for FOT.
If the last step of the derivation of ∆ ⊢ FO δ is an application of the ∃I rule:
where the variables and constant symbols occurring in the term t are, respectively, among vy and d (denoted as t(vy, d) ), then the corresponding derivation in FOT is:
where π * is a derivation corresponding to π given by the induction hypothesis.
If the last step of the derivation of ∆ ⊢ FO δ is an application of the ∃E rule:
where π * 1 , π * 2 are, respectively, derivations corresponding to π 1 , π 2 given by the induction hypothesis, and d is a fresh constant symbol.
If the last step of the derivation of ∆ ⊢ FO δ is an application of the ∀I rule: . . .π
where d is a fresh constant symbol.
If the last step of the derivation of ∆ ⊢ FO δ is an application of the ∀E rule: . . .π ∆ ⊢ ∀xα ∀E ∆ ⊢ α(t/x) where t = t(vy, d), then the corresponding derivation in FOT is:
.
Finally, we are in a position to prove the completeness theorem of our system.
Proof. Since FOT (being expressively equivalent to FO) is compact, we may assume that Γ is finite. Now, suppose Γ FOT φ. By RAA we derive Γ,∼ φ FOT ⊥, which is equivalent to Q 1 xθ(x, v) FOT ⊥, where ψ(v) = Q 1 xθ(x, v) is the normal form of the formula Γ ∧∼ φ given by Lemma 11. By applying ⊆wI R we obtain ∃ 1 zRz, ψ(R) FOT ⊥, where R is a fresh relation symbol, and ψ(R) is the inclusion atom-free sentence obtained from ψ(v) by replacing every inclusion atom 
where λ is a first-order atom and α is first-order. Recall that D captures downward closed ESO team properties [26] . It can be easily seen from the proof of Theorem 1 that enriching the syntax of D with the weak connective \\/ and quantifiers ∃ 1 , ∀ 1 from FOT ↓ does not increase the expressive power of the logic; in other words, D ⊕ FOT ↓ has the same expressive power as D. In this section, we introduce a system of natural deduction for the logic D ⊕ FOT ↓ by extending the systems of [27] and [33] for D so that this new system is sound and complete for FOT ↓ consequences in the sense that
whenever Γ is a set of sentences in D ⊕ FOT ↓ , and θ is a sentence in FOT ↓ . Table 2 . Some rules from the system [27] 
One crucial step in our argument for the completeness theorem involves an application of the rule
where, as in [33] , the formula∼ φ should be read as a shorthand for the defining formula of∼ φ in the language of the logic in question. In our system this rule will only be applied for φ being an FOT ↓ -sentence, and in this case∼ φ ≡ ¬φ, where ¬φ is the syntactic negation obtained by pushing negation to the very front of first-order atoms in φ using the definitions: ¬¬λ := λ, ¬(ψ ∧ χ) := ¬ψ \\/ ¬χ, ¬(ψ \\/ χ) := ¬ψ ∧ ¬χ, ¬∀ 1 xψ := ∃ 1 x¬ψ, ¬∃ 1 xψ := ∀ 1 x¬ψ.
Definition 14. The system of natural deduction for D ⊕ FOT
↓ consists of all rules of the system of D defined in [27] (including rules of identity, and particularly those rules in Table 2 ), the rule RAA for φ in the rule being an FOT ↓ -sentence, all rules in Table 1 from Section 4, and the following rules, where α ranges over first-order formulas only:
The axiom Dom stipulates that the domain of a model has at least two elements, which we assume throughout this section. This domain assumption is often postulated in the literature on dependence logic, especially because over models with singleton domain all dependence atoms become trivially true (as there is only one single assignment over such a domain). In our setting, the axiom Dom is required for Proposition 16(v), which shows that the weak disjunction \\/ is definable in terms of the other disjunction ∨ in D (as long as the domain has more than one elements). The rules ⊥∨E, \\/ wI and∀ 1 ∀Trs are evident. The invertible rule ∀ 1 Ext is an adaption of a similar rule in the system of D in [27] , and it is inspired also by a similar equivalence given in [14] . The rules =(·)wI and =(·)wE for dependence atoms were introduced in [34] in the propositional context.
Theorem 15 (Soundness
Proof. We only verify the soundness of ∀ 1 Ext, by showing that ∀ 1 xφ∨ψ ≡ ∃yz∀ 1 x((y = z ∧ φ) ∨ (y = z ∧ ψ)). For the left to right direction, suppose M |= X ∀ 1 xφ ∨ ψ, and we may w.l.o.g. also assume that x, y, z / ∈ dom(X). Then there exist Y, Z ⊆ X such that
For the right to left direction, suppose
In the following proposition we list some technical clauses that will be used in our proof of the completeness theorem. In addition, Proposition 8(i)(ii) are still derivable in the system of D ⊕ FOT ↓ by the same derivation. (ii) =(cx, y) ⊣⊢ =(x, y) for any constant symbol c.
, where x, y are fresh. (vi) ∃x∀ 1 yφ(x, y, z) ⊢ ∀ 1 y∃x(=(z, x) ∧ φ) and ∀x∀ 1 yφ ⊣⊢ ∀ 1 y∀xφ.
Proof. Item (i): By rules of identity we have ⊢ c = c ∧ z = z, which implies ⊢ ∃x∀y(x = c ∧ z = z). Now, by =(·)I we derive ⊢ ∀y∃x(=(z, x) ∧ x = c ∧ z = z), which yields ⊢ =(z, c).
Item (ii): For the direction =(cx, y) ⊢ =(x, y), by applying =(·)wE we derive that =(cx, y), =(c), con(x) ⊢ =(y). Since ⊢ =(c) by item (i), we conclude by =(·)wI that =(cx, y) ⊢ =(x, y). The other direction is derived similarly by applying =(·)wE, =(·)wI and item (i).
Items (iii): By Proposition 8(i) and ∀ 1 I it suffices to show Qu(φ(c/v) ∧ =(cx, y)) ⊣⊢ Quφ(c/v) ∧ =(x, y) and Qu(φ(c/v) ∧ =(x, c)) ⊣⊢ Quφ(c/v). But these follow from items (i) and (ii).
Item (iv): The direction ∃x(=(x) ∧ φ) ⊢ ∃ 1 xφ follows easily from ∃E and ∃ 1 I. For the other direction, by Proposition 16(i), we have ∃ 1 xφ ⊢ φ(c/x). Moreover, by rules of identity, ⊢ =(c) and ∃I, we have φ(c/x) ⊢ ∃x(x = c ∧ =(c) ∧ φ(c/x)) ⊢ ∃x(=(x) ∧ φ). Putting these together we obtain ∃ 1 xφ ⊢ ∃x(=(x) ∧ φ).
Item (v): We first prove the right to left direction. By ∃E it suffices to prove that =(x), =(y), (x = y ∧φ)∨(x = y ∧ψ) ⊢ φ \\/ ψ. We first derive =(x), =(y) ⊢ x = y \\/ x = y by \\/ wI. Next, by applying ∨Sub, ⊥ ∨ E and \\/I, we derive x = y, (x = y ∧ φ) ∨ (x = y ∧ ψ) ⊢ φ ∨ (x = y ∧ x = y) ⊢ φ ∨ ⊥ ⊢ φ ⊢ φ \\/ ψ and similarly x = y, (x = y ∧ φ) ∨ (x = y ∧ ψ) ⊢ φ \\/ ψ. Hence, we conclude by \\/E that x = y \\/ x = y, (x = y ∧ φ) ∨ (x = y ∧ ψ) ⊢ φ \\/ ψ, from which the desired clause follows.
For the left to right direction, by \\/ I, it suffices to prove that the right formula is derivable from both φ and ψ. We now first derive the right hand side from φ. By the rules of identity, ⊢ ∃x∀z(x = x) for some fresh variables x, z. Thus, we conclude by applying =(·)I that ⊢ ∀z∃x(=(x) ∧ x = x), which reduces to ⊢ ∃x =(x). Next, we derive by rules of identity that ⊢ ∃x(=(x)∧∃y(x = y)) and thus ⊢ ∃x∃y(=(x)∧=(y)∧x = y). Lastly, we conclude by the introduction rule of ∨ that φ ⊢ ∃x∃y(=(x)∧=(y) ∧ x = y ∧ φ) ⊢ ∃x∃y(=(x)∧=(y) ∧ ((x = y ∧ φ) ∨ (x = y ∧ ψ))).
Similarly, to derive the right hand side from ψ, first note that by Dom we have ⊢ ∃x∃y(x = y) for some fresh variables x, y, which then yields ⊢ ∃x∀z∃y(x = y). Then, by a similar argument as above, we derive by applying =(·)I that ⊢ ∃x(=(x) ∧ ∃y(x = y)), and that ⊢ ∃y(=(y) ∧ ∃x(=(x) ∧ (x = y))), from which the required clause follows.
Item (vi): ∀x∀ 1 yφ ⊣⊢ ∀ 1 y∀xφ follows easily from Proposition 8(i). For the other clause, by ∃E, it suffices to prove ∀ 1 yφ(x, y, z) ⊢ ∀ 1 y∃x(=(z, x) ∧ φ). We derive by Proposition 8(i) and the rules for ∀,∃ that ∀ 1 yφ(x, y, z) ⊢ φ(x, c, z) ⊢ ∃x∀wφ(x, c, z) for some fresh constant symbol c and variable w. Moreover, by =(·)I we derive that ∃x∀wφ(x, c, z) ⊢ ∀w∃x(=(z, x) ∧ φ(x, c, z)) ⊢ ∃x(=(z, x) ∧ φ(x, c, z)). Putting these together and by applying ∀ 1 I we conclude that ∀ 1 yφ(x, y, z) ⊢ ∃x(=(z, x) ∧ φ(x, c, z)) ⊢ ∀ 1 y∃x(=(z, x) ∧ φ).
⊓ ⊔
Recall from [31] that every D-formula φ(z) is logically equivalent to a formula of the form ∀x∃y i∈I =(x i , y i ) ∧ α(x, y, z) ,
where each x i are from x, each y i is from y, and α is first-order. In the next theorem we derive a similar normal form for formulas in D ⊕ FOT ↓ .
Theorem 17. Every D ⊕ FOT ↓ -formula φ(z) is semantically equivalent to, and provably implies a formula of the form
where each x i are from x, each y i is from y, and α is first-order.
FOT ↓ -sentence. Let Γ * be the set of all approximations of sentences in Γ ∪ {¬θ}. By Theorem 18, we have Γ * ⊥. Since restricted to first-order formulas our extended system (or the system of D as defined in [27] ) has the same rules as the deduction system of the usual first-order logic, we derive Γ * FO ⊥. From this point on we follow exactly the argument in [27] to find a model M for Γ ∪ {¬θ}. Thus, M |= Γ and M |= θ. ⊓ ⊔
